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Feminists frequently lament the fact that women are too often viewed primarily, 
and in some cases exclusively, as sex objects and valued primarily or exclusively in 
terms of an externally dictated and generalized conception of sexiness. Sexual 
objectification in a male-dominated and heteronormative society functions to 
reduce women to objects to be used at the discretion of men. Women are socialized 
to believe that sexiness is essential to their value as persons and are moreover 
socialized to accept a narrow conception of sexiness, one that excludes large 
portions of the female population from being considered sexy. Under these 
conditions, sexiness is not something a woman can secure for herself; it is not “up 
to her.” To be sexy, in this ordinary sense, is to satisfy a set of standards for 
appearance and behavior that are the outgrowth of a specific, societally shaped, 
heterosexual male gaze. It is extremely unlikely that any particular woman will 
fully satisfy all of these standards, and more unlikely still—probably impossible—
that she’ll be able to sustain the ideal throughout her lifetime. Even if embodying 
the ideal were possible, many women would not wish to shape themselves in the 
required ways, as doing so demands considerable effort, cost, sacrifice, suffering, 
and conformity. Even those who “willingly” strive to shape themselves to meet the 
ideal of sexiness will incur these costs. As sexiness is commonly understood, its 
ultimate arbiter is not the woman herself and not even her most intimate and 
loving partners; rather it is an externally dictated, fixed standard that is set for all 
women without any sensitivity to variable factors that help distinguish women 
from one another, such as age, race, size, interests, and personality. Thus, the kind 
of sexiness expected of women leaves little room for and basically ignores her 
individual autonomous sexual agency.
Given the socialization of women to believe that sexiness is essential to their value 
as persons, and given the narrow conception of sexiness prescribed, it is not surpris-
ing that some feminists suggest we give up on sexiness altogether: calling a person 
“sexy” in the standard sense at best ignores and sometimes even denies the person’s 
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agency, subjectivity, and autonomy. In other words, to say someone, especially a 
woman, is sexy is to reduce them to an object—a thing.
However, feminists are not in complete agreement here. For example, Martha 
Nussbaum (1995) has argued that sexual objectification is not necessarily incompati-
ble with respect and egalitarian interaction. Though we argue along different lines 
than Nussbaum, we too believe that completely giving up on sexiness is a mistake. We 
maintain that, rather than accepting the common notion of sexiness that links sexi-
ness with objecthood, feminists should reclaim and redefine sexiness and its domain.
This is not a new idea: disability theorists have long been talking about the tension 
between feminism and disability theory concerning women’s differing relationships 
with beauty standards relative to how “normal” they are read as being (e.g. Garland-
Thomson 1997, 2009). Whereas some women rightly find sexual attention objectify-
ing, others, such as disabled, elderly, or pregnant women, may find a lack of sexual 
attention disturbing and dehumanizing. A persistent failure to apprehend another’s 
sexiness can be tantamount to a failure to recognize them as a subject—as a person. As 
Ann Cahill (2011, 84) points out:
Because sexuality necessarily entails intersubjectivity, and because sexuality is a crucial ele-
ment of selfhood, to be on the receiving end of a sexualizing gaze can enhance one’s sense of 
self. To have that gaze skip over you, to be rendered sexually invisible by society at large, is to 
have your full personhood denied.
So, whereas many feminists express concern over sexiness because finding someone 
sexy often involves treating that person as an object, we are here concerned about the 
failure to notice a person’s sexiness because it can involve ignoring that another per-
son is a subject.
Admittedly, we should resist the prescribed standards of sexy looks and sexy behav-
ior, such as those prevalent in contemporary media. As Gail Dines (2010, 107) argues 
in Pornland: How Porn Has Hijacked Our Sexuality:
With headlines every month promising “Hot New Sex Tricks,” “21 Naughty Sex Tips,” “Little 
Moves That Make Sex Hotter,” “67 New Blow-His-Mind Moves,” “8 Sex Positions You Haven’t 
Thought Of,” and so on, women seem to experience no authentic sexual pleasure; rather, what 
she wants and enjoys is what he wants and enjoys. . . . In Cosmopolitan, as in much of pop cul-
ture, her pleasure is derived not from being a desiring subject but from being a desired object.
Here we seek to make room for women as sexy subjects who are free to desire and 
pursue the sorts of pleasure they find worthwhile.
In this spirit of articulating an authentic notion of sexual pleasure and a holistic 
conception of autonomous sexual agency, for women in particular but not exclusively, 
we propose a revisionist notion of sexiness that treats people not merely as sex objects, 
but as sexual subjects. Our project is revisionist, not descriptive of what people typi-
cally mean when they make attributions of sexiness: we agree with the feminist cri-
tique that there is very often something ethically corrupt at work in such attributions. 
We are interested in the mutuality and respect invoked in Cahill’s characterization of 
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the intersubjectivity of sexualizing another. We argue for a normatively infused con-
ception of sexiness that accommodates respect for persons while remaining in touch 
with the core connection of sexiness to the idea of sexual pleasure linked to desire.
We argue that full-fledged sexiness, normatively conceived, is not a property that 
can be attributed to a person without attention to their subjectivity: sexiness is a way 
of being, a process, not a possession. Just as the truth conditions of “They are happy” 
include the status of some of the subject’s mental states and attitudes, so do the truth 
conditions of “They are sexy.”1 Sexiness in our sense (as opposed to the appearance of 
sexiness), then, is most properly attributed to persons and only derivatively, tangen-
tially, or metaphorically to other animate or inanimate objects.
Sexiness as we are conceiving of it here is a powerful aesthetic notion with neces-
sary connections to ethics. Sexiness is an aesthetic notion because it is a property that 
we attribute through practices of appreciation, and it relates in part to the attractive-
ness of the person to whom it is attributed—though, as we shall argue, it should not be 
tied to judgments of conventional bodily attractiveness. We argue there is an ethical 
imperative to shape one’s aesthetic judgments regarding the sexiness of others so as to 
respect their subjectivity, rather than just assessing their physical attractiveness or 
their appeal as objects for sexual use. This is not to advocate an ethical imperative to be 
sexually attracted to others; indeed, the way of thinking about sexiness we advocate 
here is divorced from the instrumental, thus making sense of attributing the property 
of sexiness to persons to whom one is not sexually attracted.
16.1 The Biological Sense of Sexiness: Sexy as Fertile
Before developing our own revisionist conception, we engage in some descriptive 
analysis by introducing two conceptions of sexiness that are in common usage: the 
biological sense and the prurient sense. The biological sense of sexiness links the attri-
bution of sexiness to the ability to reproduce. This is the sense that is often espoused by 
evolutionary psychologists. Their analyses rely on speculation (sometimes on rather 
dubious grounds) about how our aesthetic standards and related attitudes and behav-
ior have been shaped by evolution. This notion of sexiness is implicit in many attempts 
to explain and justify our sexual attractions. In Survival of the Prettiest, Nancy Etcoff 
explores the evolutionary roots of human attractiveness:
Evolutionary psychologists suggest that men are automatically excited by signs of a woman 
who is fertile, healthy, and hasn’t been pregnant before. . . .
A man may have no interest in getting a woman pregnant, he may take elaborate precautions 
not to, but his mate detectors are still firing, and he is still inexplicably turned on by the woman 
1 We here and at various other points use “they” and “their” to indicate a singular subject regardless of 
gender. “[T]he use of plural pronouns to refer back to a singular subject isn’t new: it represents a revival of 
a practice dating from the 16th century” <http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/words/he-or-she-versus-
they> (accessed November 2015).
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who flashes abundant evidence of her fertility. And women are still imitating the appearance 
of this visually preferred age group, even if they never want to be pregnant at all. (1999, 72, 74)
Considering sexiness as tied to reproductive health helps to explain why youthfulness 
is often such an attractive trait. Women are youthful in appearance during their most 
fertile years. It also explains why pregnant, elderly, and disabled women are often 
excluded from the category of sexiness. A woman who is obviously pregnant cannot 
be impregnated again; for the time being at least, she is unavailable for that purpose. 
Elderly women are likely to be past their fertile years. Similarly, some forms of disabil-
ity are assumed, often wrongly, to involve infertility; and the further assumption is 
often made that the disabled individual is incapable of and/or uninterested in sex. 
Notably, this latter assumption is based on reductive understanding of sex as hetero-
sexual, genital, and penetrative. If pregnant, elderly, and disabled women are ever 
rightly considered sexy, as we hold they are, the biological sense of sexiness does not 
explain when or why. It leaves women who are, or are generally taken to be, infertile 
out completely. The biological sense of sexiness is thus clearly insufficient as a full 
conception of sexiness.
Other problems, too, confront the biological conception of sexiness. As Stephen 
Davies (Chapter 7, this volume) notes, it ignores the extensive interaction between social 
factors and attributions of sexual attractiveness. Insofar as it ties the judgment of sexiness 
to a “natural” desire, albeit possibly unconscious or disavowed, to reproduce, this notion 
of sexiness seems to render same-sex attribution of sexiness nonsensical. Indeed, it 
appeals to an unconfirmable heteronormative evolutionary past with a rigid gender iden-
tity binary. But this appeal is speculative, not scientific, as Kim Hall (2012, 35) argues:
The fact that there were female evolutionary ancestors who had sex with male evolutionary 
ancestors does not preclude the possibility that they also had same-sex sexual relations. 
Moreover, it does not preclude the possibility that at least some had exclusively same-sex sex-
ual relations. Did our female and male evolutionary ancestors understand themselves to be 
“women” and “men”? Were they recognized by other members of their group as “women” and 
“men” to the extent that they conformed to then-existing gender norms? Were there some 
“females” and “males” who were not recognized as (and did not understand themselves to be) 
“women” or “men”? Were there intersex members of ancestral environments who were per-
ceived to be (and who perceived themselves to be) neither “male” nor “female”? My point is 
that the complex relation among sex, gender, and desire is precisely that for which no evolu-
tionary evidence exists. Evolutionary psychology can only speculate about the gender and 
sexual identities of our evolutionary ancestors.
At worst, the biological account ignores and at best it vastly underplays the cultural 
and learned aspects of standards of personal appearance and comportment. As a 
result, it cannot explain the sexiness that, in our culture, is often attributed to 
extremely thin women. The representations of supermodels whose Photoshopped 
images perpetuate the ideal of the impossibly thin female body make them appear 
unlikely to be able to conceive a child, and they certainly do not advertise fertility via 
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any of the signs evolutionary psychologists appeal to in this context (large breasts, 
fleshy buttocks, a curvaceous figure, and so on). Indeed, infertility is one of the earliest 
and most typical outcomes of eating disorders and excessive diet and exercise. This 
account not only precludes the possibility of elderly, pregnant, and/or disabled wom-
en’s sexiness; it also leaves unexplained current widespread beauty standards and the 
familiar practice of noticing sexiness in men and women, regardless of one’s own sex-
ual orientation.
Even more problematic are the broader moral implications of the biological sense 
of sexiness. This way of conceiving of sexiness ties a women’s sexiness to her perceived 
ability to serve a particular function. Regardless of whether the evolutionary psy-
chologist is correct about the roots of sexual attraction, the fact that certain behaviors 
and attitudes were perpetuated in our past hardly justifies a failure to reevaluate them 
today (cf. Hall 2012, 32).
Etcoff admits that the “medical science of fertility and reproduction now makes it 
possible for women to have babies into their sixties.” She wonders if “these changes 
altered our tastes in beauty and made age and fertility cues in women obsolete.” 
She says:
In a world guided solely by thought, not instinct, the answer would be yes. But we are products 
of evolution and cannot change instincts as quickly as we can change our tastes or update our 
information. The frenzy over beauty and the enormous business in mimicking youth show 
that we are still turned on by the usual suspects. (1999, 74)
Though Etcoff is correct that this is not a world guided solely by thought, it is equally cor-
rect (and perhaps more important) to point out that this is not a world guided solely by 
instinct. Human beings are social, cultural, and intelligent beings, and social, cultural, 
and intellectual factors heavily influence—some would say all but determine—what we 
find sexy (cf. Davies, Chapter 7, this volume). Moreover, the appeal to evolutionary roots 
to explain our current tastes ignores the fact that there is no universal, cross-cultural 
agreement about sexiness. There are cultural differences in preferences for faces and bod-
ies, and even where we find commonalities in taste, the underlying cause of preference 
may differ from culture to culture (Cunningham et al. 1995).
There is also good reason for feminists to resist this notion of sexiness precisely 
because of its emphasis on reproduction. The feminist movement is in part a movement 
to earn reproductive freedom—including freedom from reproduction—for women. It 
is perfectly reasonable, then, for women to resist being considered sexy in this manner, 
since it is based on, and perhaps even reduces women to, their reproductive fitness. Sex 
and sexuality are not reducible to reproduction; women are more than reproduction 
machines, even when considered as sexual beings. Feminists have worked and continue 
to work hard to divorce sex from reproduction. Why should we accept a notion of sexi-
ness that, when applied to us, reinstates that connection in a reductive manner? We 
shouldn’t, and we’re right to resist this conception of sexiness for its inability to account 
for all the ways in which people can and do value one another sexually.
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16.2 The Prurient Sense of Sexiness: Sexy as Arousing
The second notion of sexiness in common currency is the prurient sense. Sexiness in 
this sense has to do with sexual pleasure and satisfaction and does not necessarily 
appeal to biology or reproduction (although it may). It understands sexiness as imme-
diately captivating and stimulating our prurient interests, stoking a desire for a sexual 
encounter. Attributing the property of sexiness in this sense to someone says some-
thing about the person described and about ourselves: they are sexy; we are aroused. 
Whereas seeing someone as sexy in the biological sense doesn’t necessarily entail one’s 
own arousal, an attribution of sexiness in the prurient sense is definitely linked with 
arousal and with seeing someone as a potential instrument for one’s own sexual 
gratification.
Feminists should not reject this sense altogether. As Nussbaum, following Cass 
Sunstein, points out, in such matters context is everything: “Under some specifica-
tions, objectification . . . is always morally problematic. Under other specifications, 
objectification has features that may be either good or bad, depending upon the over-
all context” (Nussbaum 1995, 251).2 Whereas a woman being presented in a submis-
sive or degrading manner to the general public as an object to stoke prurient interests 
is objectionable, it may be perfectly appropriate for such interests to be stoked in a 
variety of ways in the context of an intimate, consensual encounter.
Yet current standards of prurient sexiness are unduly narrow, excluding many 
women. As did the biological notion, the prurient conception of sexiness classifies 
pregnant, disabled, and elderly women as asexual, as unable or unfit to engage in 
sexual intercourse and give or receive sexual satisfaction. Pregnant, elderly, or disa-
bled women often aren’t even considered candidates for being accurately described 
as sexy in the prurient sense. Sexuality and sexual pleasure are important aspects of 
many human lives; and given the importance people often place on their sexuality 
and the effort people often funnel into cultivating their sex appeal, ignoring the sexu-
ality of an individual can involve a failure to recognize a central aspect of the full-
fledged humanity of that person. As Nathaniel Adam Tobias Coleman3 argues in “The 
Political Power of Sexual Preference,” such failures can reinforce stigmas, particu-
larly race-based ones, that diminish people’s self-worth and reinforce their subordi-
nate social position. As he says:
[O]ne’s capacity as a sexual being for affirming the sexual attractiveness of another sexual 
being is, in the hands of a member of some social group that is dominant in society, not merely 
2 Kathleen Stock (2015) agrees, and argues that the dispute among feminists over the acceptability of 
objectification is only apparent: Nussbaum uses the term to name both acceptable and problematic modes 
of engaging with others, while some other feminist thinkers use the term to name only modes that are 
ethically compromised.
3 For an explanation of Coleman’s choice to strike through his surname, see here: <http://www.ucl.ac.
uk/philosophy/people/nathaniel-adam-tobias-coleman-explanation> (accessed November 2015).
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a personal privilege, but a significant political power. It is significant because it can contribute 
to ending a trend of social stigmatization in that society.4
For these reasons, another notion of sexiness is needed to supplement these common 
uses, one that allows for the appreciation of a plurality of bodies, sees sexiness as tied 
to subjectivity, and is not morally suspect. To this end, we suggest a conception of 
sexiness that appreciates sexiness as a matter of both embodiment and subjectivity 
and accords sexual beings the respect due to all persons.
16.3 The Ethics of the Respectful Notion of Sexiness: 
Sexy as Subjective
The respectful notion of sexiness merges a concern for the subjective and embodied 
life of a person with an assessment of their body as a sexualized one. To find a person 
sexy in this sense is to see their body as infused with an expression of self and ani-
mated by their own sexual identity. This will involve finding someone sexually appeal-
ing although not necessarily sexually arousing. In this sense of sexiness, sexuality can 
be divorced from fertility and the prurient interests of another.
Respecting sexiness involves seeing others not (only) as sex objects but necessarily 
as sexual subjects: human beings who are in charge of their sexual agency. Their 
appeal is intrinsic to them: it comes from them, rather than being defined by exter-
nally imposed standards, especially those associated with oppressive social forces. To 
sexualize persons respectfully, it may be necessary to work intentionally to expand, 
perhaps greatly, the kinds of bodies we find appealing. It is important to be clear about 
what kind of expansion is relevant: it is not just starting from the “center” of conven-
tionally attractive bodies and moving outward in concentric circles to detect the 
appeal of bodies that resemble these along various dimensions. The idea is, rather, to 
distance ourselves from the very standards that define some bodies as conventionally 
attractive; to jettison those standards and seek, instead, the magnificence5 that is man-
ifest here and now. Ann Cahill (2011, 103) expresses the idea as follows:
[O]ne must look with wonder. One must take bodies on their own terms, without imposing a 
pre-existing standard upon them. The ethical sexual gaze hungrily seeks out the particular, the 
surprising, the nowhere-else-but-here-ness that marks each incarnation of the sexed human.
To make ethically sound attributions of sexiness, appreciation of the sexual particu-
larity of a wide variety of bodies needs to be developed to ensure that our sexualized 
4 Coleman (unpublished, 1). Coleman argues, for this reason, that white men have a duty to divest 
themselves of sexual aversions to black women. He does not argue for a duty to cultivate sexual attraction 
toward them. We, on the other hand, do argue for a duty to cultivate a habit of recognizing sexiness, 
although not necessarily a subjective sexual desire for or attraction toward, when sexiness is properly 
understood in the respectful sense.
5 We draw this term from Mia Mingus (2011), who sees the magnificent as more closely aligned with 
the “ugly” than with the conventionally beautiful.
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awareness takes into account not bodies exclusively, but rather embodied subjects. To 
find someone sexy, in the respectful sense, is to recognize the sexualized subject ani-
mated in a body and to respect the subject in part for how they choose or choose not to 
infuse their own version of sexuality in their own body.
But when it comes to respecting subjectivity in sexuality, should we aim for univer-
sal appreciation, or is there a certain model of subjectivity that we should be drawn to? 
In adopting this revisionist notion of sexiness, we are trying to create space to value 
people as they are and strive to be rather than in virtue of conformity to narrow exter-
nal standards. It makes sense, then, to cultivate sensitivity, awareness, and an ability to 
recognize the attractiveness of people on their own terms. Genuine sexual expression 
comes from and is for the sake of individuals, as opposed to aiming to conform to 
some external ideal. Obviously, in practice it can be difficult to ascertain the extent to 
which another person’s sexual expression is genuine. Yet we can and do aim to detect 
genuineness (or lack thereof) in others in a broad range of contexts. Interestingly, we 
do this by trying to understand the person behind whatever expression or behavior is 
under consideration. Identifying genuineness in sexuality, then, involves empathy.
Genuineness is not an all-or-nothing achievement; it is best understood on a con-
tinuum. Although there will admittedly be unclear cases, there will also be expres-
sions at or approaching either end of the spectrum that are pretty obviously genuine 
or not. Evidence of genuineness will be found in originality, comfort, confidence, 
playfulness, and a sense of improvisation, whereas conformity, discomfort, insecurity, 
and strict adherence to norms will be evidence of a lack of genuineness in sexual 
expression. Celebrating genuine sexiness will then result in a greater diversity of 
embodied expressions of sexuality. Of course, there are limits here—genuine expres-
sions that hinge on exploitation or non-consensual sexual activity, such as that of the 
pedophile or rapist, must be partly repressed rather than allowed free rein—and this is 
underscored by the empathy requirement just mentioned. Understanding a child’s 
perspective and feelings should impede the pedophile’s comfort with sexualizing that 
child in ways a child cannot understand and would not independently desire. This 
allows for children’s sexuality, which is an important although rarely discussed aspect 
of childhood. As Mark Vopat (2003, 157) insists: “Children are sexual beings, and that 
aspect of their lives requires the same type of care and concern that we attach to other 
aspects of their well-being.”
In general, to appreciate the extent to which a person achieves a degree of self- 
understanding and comfort as a sexual being, and the ways they infuse energy and 
flavor into the self they are exploring, is to respectfully appreciate another’s sexiness.
16.4 Considering Objections
Not every way of incorporating a person’s subjectivity into assessments of their sexi-
ness strikes the target we are indicating here. As Susan Bordo (1999) argues, much 
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objectionable pornography functions not by objectifying women, but by attributing 
to them a form of subjectivity that expresses active desire for whatever treatment a 
male sexual partner might choose to offer, no matter how degrading.6 Attributions of 
sexiness that evoke narrow requirements to fit a compromised mode of subjectivity 
are not fully respectful; they are more akin to the prurient judgments discussed earlier. 
Ethical attributions of sexiness should look for flexible but self-possessed subjectivi-
ties, just as they should take into account the magnificence of a wide variety of bodies. 
Much mainstream pornography also provides an illustrative example of precisely 
what we want to diminish: that is, when it depicts sex acts that are seemingly painful 
and degrading to the woman involved while conveying that her negative feelings—
her pain and shame—are irrelevant or, if relevant, serve to increase the pleasure of 
male participants and viewers. If someone is presented as sexy in this manner, it is 
not in the sense we are advocating here, as the scenes incorporate no respect for her 
subjectivity; indeed, it may be that respecting her subjectivity would interfere with 
deriving sexual pleasure from the scene in the prescribed way.
One might wonder whether it is really possible to shape what we find sexy. Can we 
come to experience as attractive kinds of bodies that we don’t already experience in 
this way? Can we learn to experience as sexy not just bodies, but embodied persons? 
We have spoken of the requirement to expand the scope of the sorts of bodies we find 
attractive to encourage the appreciation of a larger complement of embodied beings. 
Some might balk at the suggestion that we should do anything of the sort, claiming 
that since we can’t control to whom we are attracted, we can’t be held morally account-
able when we are or are not attracted.
But the effects of media on beauty standards and the contours of sexualization are 
evidence that sexual desire does not arise unmediated in us. People can take an active 
role in shaping their desires rather than just passively acquiescing to desire as a simple 
given. Which bodies are found attractive is influenced by society, and can change over 
time for a variety of reasons. For example, as we age, we may naturally come to find 
older people sexy.7 We can come to find someone sexually attractive after initially 
being drawn to their personality and only then turning our attentive and receptive 
gaze upon their body. We may have a casual sexual encounter with someone we did 
not find especially attractive, but find the sex so satisfying and pleasurable that their 
body now presents itself to us as highly desirable. The fact that these changes happen 
suggests that there are levers for the shaping of sexual desire, and once this is admitted 
there is no reason to think that we cannot work to manipulate some of those levers 
6 We are grateful to Amy Coplan for this point.
7 An analyst for the dating web site OkCupid found gender differences in how dating preferences 
change with age: women, as they age, tend to indicate a preference for and send messages to men within 
their own age group; men, on the other hand, continue to indicate a preference for and send messages to 
women who are significantly younger. As the author suggests (and, indeed, recommends), it is open to 
men consciously to change their dating behavior in order to rectify the resulting decline in dating oppor-
tunities for women as they age (Rudder 2010).
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ourselves. As Davies (Chapter 7, this volume) notes, “When we become aware of the 
way biology generates the preferences that pull and push us, we can interrogate those 
preferences. If we choose not to own them, we can frequently override them, having 
higher preferences more generally about the kind of person we want to be.” The same, 
we suggest, is true, and probably a fortiori, for preferences that are culturally shaped.
As Coleman (unpublished, 15–16) argues, societal support may be helpful or even 
necessary as we attempt to reshape our preferences. Media can assist in this endeavor 
by reinforcing healthy and diverse sexuality, exposing audiences to diverse manifesta-
tions of sexuality in diverse groups of persons, though mainstream media typically 
fails to do so.
The objection that we cannot reshape our conception of sexiness relies on a naïve 
and ahistorical view of taste that fails to realize the extent to which our aesthetic tastes, 
broadly understood, are mediated by various cultural and personal factors. Our tastes 
come from our individual and cultural histories, and when such histories fail to 
expose us to or to encourage us to value broad and diverse objects of appreciation, the 
responsibility falls to individuals to demand such exposure and encourage others to 
do the same. If a person’s family of origin and community are racially homogeneous 
and the race with which the person identifies is the dominant race (which is also the 
race most often and most favorably represented in the media), they may be less likely 
to find persons of other races attractive, and may even feel aversion to them. We would 
hold this person, in adulthood, responsible for whether they go beyond their upbring-
ing to unlearn the prejudice they were surrounded by, and, importantly, for encourag-
ing others to do the same.
Moreover, we clearly do hold people accountable for their sexual tastes, for exam-
ple, when we maintain that the pedophile or the rapist ought not only not molest or 
sexually assault, but not want to molest or assault. Not just the actions, but their moti-
vating desires and feelings are morally inappropriate (cf. Cahill, Chapter 15, this vol-
ume). Of course, the actions and the feelings are not morally identical. But in a culture 
that increasingly sexualizes young girls and eroticizes violence against women, soci-
ety bears part of the responsibility for the violence—sexual and otherwise—and 
degrading attention that befalls girls and women.
If we can accept the idea that we are rightly held morally responsible for certain 
tastes that we ought not to have, why is it so difficult to accept the idea that we are 
rightly held morally responsible for certain tastes we ought to have? Each time one 
sexually admires a body, whether in person or in an image, one is both expressing one’s 
current sexual preferences and reinforcing them. When one allows their admiration to 
be directed toward a certain narrow range of bodies, one reinforces an association 
between those bodies and sexiness. But it is in one’s power to make different choices: 
one can choose to admire or contemplate real or imagined bodies that do not fit the 
narrow mold of attractiveness that has been societally inculcated. Our suggestion, 
here, is not that one can simply change one’s desires by fiat through rational argument: 
we do not expect that after reading this paper anyone will magically find themselves 
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with a different desire set. Instead, the aim of our argument is to supply motivation to 
engage in a form of ethical and aesthetic practice: a practice by which one consciously 
and gradually explores and expands the boundaries and habits of taste and desire. 
Such practices of cultivating taste succeed in other domains: people can learn to 
appreciate foods and forms of art that were previously distasteful or foreign to them, 
and people can also learn to shift their preferences from one set of objects to a differ-
ent set for expressly ethical reasons, as the life history of many vegetarians attests.
Perhaps this project is more difficult for sexual desire than for gustatory taste, but 
this is not reason to reject our view.8 What we advocate is an ethical/aesthetic practice 
that is geared toward expanding and shifting one’s desires, not a practice of self-decep-
tion, of masochistic self-denial, or of pursuing sexual interactions with those to whom 
one is not attracted. The fact that some people may experience smaller or slower shifts 
in their tastes and desires is not a reason to think that the ethical imperative to under-
take the practice does not apply.
Another important question, related to the issue of lability of taste and desire, concerns 
sexual orientation and gender. Should heterosexually or homosexually identified indi-
viduals work to reshape their desires only in relation to members of the sex or gender they 
experience themselves as attracted to? Or does the project extend to coming to experi-
ence sexual attraction to people they understand as being outside that sex or gender?
Two issues arise here. First, attributions of sexiness in a respectful manner are not 
always linked to the attributor’s own experience of sexual desire. As Davies (Chapter 7, 
this volume) notes, once we acknowledge the broader social role of sexual attractive-
ness, “it becomes possible to decouple the notion of sexual attractiveness from the 
desire to have sex or mate, so that it can be a common assessment of oneself and others 
without being tied to a disposition to display overtly sexual behavior.” A lesbian can say 
of a man that he is sexy, meaning not necessarily that she experiences desire for him but 
that she recognizes that he is desirable. Likewise, to say appropriately of someone that 
he is sexy, if I do not myself feel sexually attracted to him, is to say that I recognize that 
he possesses physical features that are magnificent in their particularity (in the sense 
discussed earlier), and that I recognize his body as infused with his sexual subjectivity. 
Such an attribution might be indexed to the desires of some other subject: it might be a 
recognition that another would be sexually attracted to him. Or it might be cued to a 
counterfactual version of myself: to say of him that he is sexy might be to say that if 
I were sexually interested in men, or if I were in a different mood, or if I had the energy, 
and so on, I imagine I would experience desire for him, or that I can fully understand 
why and how someone sexually desires him even if I do not.
8 Perhaps this malleability is, on average, more difficult for men than for women, but we aren’t sure. It 
is possible that research on the malleability of female sexual desire is driven in part by a heterosexual male 
interest in lesbian sex, and the appearance of fixed male sexuality may be due as much to the strong social 
policing of male sexual preference as to any innate mechanism. Everything we say here is compatible with 
the possibility that the difference between male and female sexual malleability is either a fiction or a reality 
that is socially rather than biologically constructed. See Diamond (2008) for related discussion.
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However, the possibility of appropriate attributions of sexiness without experiencing 
desire does not mean that we need not concern ourselves with our desires as well. It will 
not do to say, “He is sexy, and by that I mean that I would experience sexual desire for 
him if I were attracted to fat men”; “She is sexy, and by that I mean that a person who 
finds it possible to experience desire for elderly women would desire her.” Such attribu-
tions of sexiness keyed to counterfactual or hypothetical desire do not secure true sexual 
recognition for people who do not satisfy conventional standards of attractiveness. We 
must genuinely do the work of reshaping our desires by going beyond postulating an 
abstract hypothetical appreciator and actually engaging in practices of appreciation of 
sexual subjects embodied in diverse bodies; this is the primary way of adopting a more 
ethically and aesthetically adequate notion of sexiness.
This leads us back to the second issue related to sexual orientation and gender; we 
suggest that gender is one of the boundaries we should aim to stretch as we reshape 
whom we find sexy. Conventional standards of attractiveness are unduly constraining 
by requiring compliance with rigidly defined gender roles. Withholding or diverting 
sexual attention from gender noncompliant people is a form of punitive social control 
functioning as a strong incentive to refrain from exploration at or beyond the socially 
acceptable gender presentation associated with our assigned gender. Space con-
straints don’t allow us the room to argue for all of the ways this form of social control is 
undesirable, but we can note a few. First, it sustains patriarchal power structures by 
conveying a sharp distinction between women and men, thus creating competition, 
insecurity, and distrust. Second, it disproportionately inflicts undesirable constraints 
on women, as women’s bodies and appearances are most fervently and frequently 
policed. Third, it harms anyone who is unable or unwilling to stay within the “middle 
ground” of a particular gender identity, or who experiences great discomfort there. 
Finally, it forces self-denial and even self-deception because in reality we are each gen-
dered (and classed, racialized, etc.) in diverse and constructed ways. Reshaping our 
sexual attractions so as not to contribute to the policing of gender boundaries is thus 
ethically and personally desirable.
Moreover, attending to embodied persons in all their physical and subjective par-
ticularity, moving attention from to the highly gendered conventional markers of 
attractiveness, one might instill the freedom to move themselves away from the “mid-
dle ground” of their assigned gender. The “center” of conventional attractiveness and 
the “middle ground” of gender can be oppressive and stultifying. For example, the 
most conventionally attractive women are also those seen as most feminine and vice 
versa, leaving women little room for playfulness or creative expression. Enjoying the 
appreciation of particular embodied subjects on their own terms, seeking the rich 
complexities manifest in different ways of being, one might find permission and even 
inspiration to transcend gender boundaries previously experienced as unforgiving 
and unsurpassable.
The prospects for such shifts in taste and presentation will vary from person to per-
son and from group to group based on a range of factors, including motivation to 
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change and openness to exploration. This does not support empirically debunked 
 phenomena such as “ex-gay” therapies, which standardly aim to extinguish attrac-
tions to people of one’s own sex and/or establish attractions to people of another sex, 
while also reinforcing conventional connections between assigned sex and gender 
presentation. Our focus is on appreciation, not attraction. And our motivation is to 
enlarge the domain of sexiness, not prescribe any one way anyone ought to feel and 
behave. We advocate neither extinction of attractions nor an aim of igniting attrac-
tions to members of a sex or gender one is not attracted to; rather, we advocate culti-
vating greater appreciative abilities for a diversity of ways in which personhood might 
be embodied sexually.
Other questions remain about the morality of the work one must do to shape 
desires in the ways we advocate. Presumably, this work will involve real and/or imagi-
native engagement with others: shaping what we experience as sexy seems to involve 
looking at and contemplating actual people with an aspiration to appreciate them as 
embodied sexual persons and, in at least some cases, to experience some desire. Is 
there something troubling, even creepy, about this sort of sexualized attention? Does 
such a project inappropriately sexualize too many of our interactions? In directing 
“aspirational” sexual attention toward people we don’t yet find sexy, do we run the risk 
of wronging or offending them? Is it just wrong to go around directing sexualized 
attention toward people regardless of whether they notice it or not?
These worries can be defused, we think, if the project of shaping what one finds sexy 
is undertaken, and understood, in the right way. The fact is that we are public entities 
in a public world, and we do direct sexualized attention at each other. This attention is 
sometimes subtle and fleeting, other times overt and flirtatious. It is often uncon-
scious and not critically examined. It is problematic when it comes in the form of 
an objectifying gaze, treating the individual as though their only value for us is in 
the sexual use we might make of them. But directing sexualized attention toward 
someone seen as a full, embodied person rather than a mere body, with an aim of 
respectfulness, is not, in general, a particularly problematic form of interpersonal 
engagement. Moreover, consciously directing this sort of attention has the advantage 
of making our sexual attractions and repulsions available to us for critical scrutiny. To 
be seen as a sexualized being, as a candidate for sexiness, can be part of being recog-
nized as a full person, as disabled people and disability theorists (e.g. Wilkerson 2002) 
have often pointed out. This doesn’t mean that every moment, every person, or every 
relationship is well suited to sexualized attention; there are good ethical reasons not to 
direct sexualized attention toward one’s employees, one’s patients, one’s students, or 
people who present as asexual or nonsexual, for instance. But to think that there is 
always something inherently troubling about even respectful sexualized attention, 
sensitively and empathetically directed in appropriate contexts, excessively curtails a 
fundamental ground of human social interactions.
This picture is complicated by the realization that some individuals will present 
themselves in ways that subvert received standards of sexiness in order to avoid 
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becoming objects of sexualized attention. Given that we recommend aiming to appre-
ciate bodies that do not fit neatly into norms of sexiness, we run the risk of calling 
 sexual attention to those very individuals who do not want it. One way to think toward 
a remedy here is to see subversions of sexiness as unique and personal expressions of 
sexiness and to recommend then that to appreciate such an individual's sexiness 
appropriately is to ignore it.
Another, more specific version of this worry is that some people, women mostly, 
find the sexual attention already directed at them excessive and unwanted. Will 
encouragement to reshape sexual tastes, especially as these pertain to women, eventu-
ate in even more excessive and unwanted sexual attention?9 A first thing to note is that 
any expression of respectful sexual attention would cease with any indication it is 
unwelcome. It is not a lecherous sexual attention that is necessarily tied to desire. In 
most contexts, it will be quite subtle, perhaps so subtle as to be undetectable by the 
person toward whom it is directed. In addition, persons who feel the weight of exces-
sive sexual attention are likely those whose self-presentation conforms to present 
standards aligned with biological or prurient sexiness. Therefore, an expansion of the 
domain of sexiness promises to give them the relief they desire by directing sexual 
attention to a wider array of sexually appealing persons. If people come to appreciate a 
broader range of body types, then their attentions should be dispersed over a larger 
class of persons, with the result that some of the excessive attention now directed to a 
few would be more evenly distributed.
Virtual appreciation is also an option. In the age of the Internet, there are sexualized 
still and moving images, pornographic and otherwise, of a wide variety of bodies, often 
freely released by the people whose bodies they are, that we can access without interac-
tion. There is, of course, the danger that in using such images to retrain our own desires, 
we reduce the person to an object. We can guard against this by expressly focusing on 
the subjectivity of the person depicted. Endeavors such as Sins Invalid,10 a performance 
project in which disabled performers present themselves as sexual subjects, provide 
non-pornographic resources for expanding our conceptions of who is sexy without 
objectification. The appreciative practices we advocate could also be supported by 
pornography that features a diverse array of both bodies and subjectivities.
One might wonder whether reshaping sexiness is relevant for people who are stably 
partnered in sexually exclusive relationships. Are they, due to commitment to their 
partner(s), exempt from the duty to examine and perhaps reshape their tastes? Do 
they have a moral obligation not to direct sexual attention toward others? Is it, per-
haps, even misleading or cruel for them to direct sexual attention toward others whom 
they do not see as real candidates for sexual relationships? The latter worry, we think, 
is misplaced. Directing respectful sexual attention toward those whom we don’t intend 
to form relationships with, for any number of reasons, can be playful and flirtatious. 
9 We are grateful to Anne Eaton and Aili Bresnahan for raising versions of this concern.
10 <http://www.sinsinvalid.org/> (accessed November 2015).
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It can be pleasurable for the recipient of the attention and boost their self-esteem. 
Indeed, when such attention comes from a person known to be “off the market,” it can 
be enjoyed without the pressures and uncertainties of sexualized attention that may 
lead somewhere. This mode of sexual interaction may, at times, be valuable precisely 
because the element of stress that often comes with sexual attention is absent. 
Moreover, the kind of attention we are recommending need not involve an invitation 
or willingness to engage in sexual relations, as perhaps sexualized attention based on 
the prurient sense would. Therefore, the attention we recommend need not be experi-
enced as more than it is: an interest in the person as a genuine embodied being.
Persons in sexually exclusive relationships have an obligation to cultivate the ability 
to experience others as sexy in the respectful sense, even leaving aside the reality that 
relationships change. Insofar as people who are exclusively partnered participate in 
discourse about sex and attractiveness, they help reinforce or resist the prevalent 
norms. Attitudes about a variety of matters have recently been shown to be subject to 
social contagion effects,11 and this suggests that shifting attitudes about sexiness in 
a positive direction may affect the attitudes of others, including friends of friends 
whom they have never met. The power each of us has to shape the attitudes and related 
behaviors of others lends further support for the ethical importance of revising our 
conceptions of sexiness.
We also have specific duties to our partners that generate a duty to expand and 
reshape our notion of sexiness. After all, we all age, and our bodies are vulnerable to 
change as a result of factors such as pregnancy and childbirth, injuries, illnesses, and 
environmental exposure. We all want to be known, loved, and desired by our partners 
in our particularity, despite, indeed because of, our faults and blemishes. So, in a 
monogamous relationship, although we may have a duty to our partners not to culti-
vate sexual interest in others in the prurient sense, we may also have a duty to our 
partners to cultivate sexual interest in others in the respectful sense.
Moreover, we send each other messages of sexual validation (or the contrary) all 
the time, even when we are not seeking out sexual partnerships or aiming to commu-
nicate sexual messages. This is a reason to cultivate respectful experiences of sexiness, 
so this attitude may become more habitual than those associated with the less respect-
ful notions of sexiness. As Laurence Thomas (1999) argues, our sexual attractions 
influence our overt behavior, with powerful consequences: if we are attracted to a job 
candidate, we are more likely to see them as the better hire independent of their quali-
fications or interview performance. We pay more attention to people we are attracted 
to and are more likely to notice their positive contributions. Moreover, as Davies 
(Chapter 7, this volume) notes following Etcoff 1999, “Treating people as attractive 
gets a better social performance from them.” These are not benign effects; they influ-
ence people’s concrete social and professional lives and are a force through which racial 
11 Christakis and Fowler 2007; Fowler and Christakis 2009. Thanks are due to Amy Coplan for pointing 
out the relevance of these contagion effects.
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injustice is reinscribed. For these reasons, the ethical imperative to cultivate respectful 
experiences of sexiness applies to everyone, not just to people who are actively seek-
ing, or expect to be seeking, sexual partnerships.
16.5 The Aesthetics of the Respectful Notion  
of Sexiness: Sexy as Subjective
Having discussed some of the ethical implications, we turn to aesthetic questions. 
One might wonder whether sexiness, in the respectful sense we advocate, is really an 
aesthetic notion at all. Are we stripping away the aesthetic content by advocating the 
cultivation of attraction to types of bodies that do not satisfy conventional standards, 
and the incorporation of the person’s subjectivity into the experience of sexiness? 
Does the fact that attributions of sexiness are usually tied up with sexual desire dis-
qualify them from the aesthetic realm?
Let’s begin with the second question. Traditional understandings of aesthetic judg-
ment as involving disinterest and distance appear to rule out the idea that attributions 
of sexiness, interwoven as they are with sexual desire, could be aesthetic. But there has 
been a move over the last several decades to reject this restriction. We belong to the 
camp of those who think that the aesthetic is, or at least can be, a matter of engaged 
attraction and desire. According to Eddy Zemach (2001, 53, 54–5):
Aesthetic predicates . . . describe the degree to which, and the manner in which, objects are 
good qua objects: what features make them perceptually salient (or non-salient) and to what 
degree they achieve that salience. . . . What makes an object perceptually salient? Obviously, the 
single most potent enhancer of salience of an object is relevance to us. We see things in terms 
of their significance to us, and that is why we perceive the situations we encounter as having 
some emotion-properties. . . . The same is true of things we perceive: an adorable thing is one 
that we see as justifying adoration, a delicate thing is a thing that we see as justifying care, a 
pitiful thing is a thing we see as justifying pity, and so on.
Noticing that an entity has a certain aesthetic property, according to Zemach, “displays 
it at the heart of our human sphere of interests and immediately invokes complex strat-
egies and manners of appropriate behavior with respect to it” (2001, 55).
For Zemach, the connection with our interests is inevitable. Furthermore, noticing 
aesthetic properties primes us to behave in certain ways. That is, appreciating a prop-
erty readies us for certain complex forms of behavior. The relevance of this analysis to 
sexiness as an aesthetic property is clear: attributions of sexiness occur through 
appreciative practices and involve perceptual salience, relevance to the self, emotional 
responses, and behavioral dispositions.
Obviously, aesthetic properties thus construed have ethical implications. It is for 
ethical reasons that we advocate the cultivation of experiences and attributions of 
 sexiness that differ from those that may “come naturally,” but this is unproblematic 
from an aesthetic perspective: admonitions to cultivate one’s taste are common in the 
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aesthetic tradition. More troubling from a traditional aesthetic perspective is that we 
advocate a situation in which attributions of sexiness branch out in many different 
directions, tracking appreciation of the particularities of a diverse array of subjects, 
rather than one in which everyone’s experiences and attributions of sexiness converge 
on some set of sexy persons. We address this worry later in the chapter.
A related question concerns whether the ethical case for altering aesthetic tastes is 
misdirected insofar as ethical reasons aren’t relevant to aesthetic taste: telling some-
one that x is ethically compromised does nothing to show it is not aesthetically valua-
ble. Reasons for thinking that factory farming is ethically abhorrent are not prima 
facie reasons for thinking that tofu is tasty or that the flavor of meat is disgusting.
But, in fact, ethical considerations interact extensively, and appropriately, with and 
within aesthetic experience. If in the midst of enjoying a delicious meal with you we 
announce that we are all dining on human flesh, your reaction will predictably be one 
of aesthetic revulsion. The very taste you were savoring a moment ago is now repul-
sive. Further, if convinced that eating animal flesh is no more acceptable than eating 
human flesh, one would lose, partly or wholly, the taste for meat.12 Other examples of 
the role of knowledge and ethics in aesthetic judgment can be found in environmental 
aesthetics. Take, for example, the invasive plant purple loosestrife: once one learns of 
its invasive tendencies, its little purple flowers can come to appear much less attrac-
tive.13 And there are many examples where the appreciation of a natural entity on its 
own terms can increase its aesthetic appeal: bats, wetlands, and carnivorous plants, 
just to name a few (Lintott 2006).
There are also ethically relevant assumptions influencing many failures to appreci-
ate an individual’s sexiness. For instance, associations between evil and bodily disabil-
ity (reinforced in scores of Hollywood films among other places) dehumanize the 
disabled person. Rejecting this stereotyping reasserts the humanity of disabled people 
and may allow for the recognition and appreciation of their sexiness.
Does the absence of objective standards undermine the status of the respectful 
notion of sexiness as aesthetic? To give a full answer to a question with deep meta- 
aesthetic underpinnings is beyond the scope of this chapter. But we note, first, that it is 
not uncommon, in contemporary aesthetic thought, to celebrate aesthetic responses 
that reflect divergent individual sensibilities rather than widely shared tendencies or 
standards (e.g. Cohen 1993; Melchionne 1998). Second, there is a significant empha-
sis on objectivity in our proposal. Attributions of sexiness, on our view, should be 
responsive to the person as they actually are, not merely as they seem to us. These 
attributions are objective in the sense of being object-directed (to a person including 
their subjectivity). Respectful attributions of sexiness are based on relevant aspects 
of the subject, especially of their subjectivity, and celebrate the person’s manifest 
12 We are grateful to Danny Nathan for discussion of this response.
13 For insightful discussion of “the purple loosestrife problem” and its implications for the disinterested 
tradition of aesthetic appreciations, see Marcia Muelder Eaton (1999).
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complexities, without reducing them through projection or fantasy. Attributions of 
sexiness, then, can be either appropriate or inappropriate: they are appropriate when 
they emerge out of the appreciation of an embodied person in all their sexualized 
particularity, and they are inappropriate when they neglect the person’s subjectivity 
and/or impose external standards of attractiveness. For this reason, attributions of 
sexiness to people who are relatively genuine may be more likely to be appropriate, 
because it is easier to respond to a genuine person as they truly are.
In conclusion, appreciating the sexiness of others in the respectful sense is both an 
aesthetic and an ethical practice. It is also a site of political resistance, given that our 
society inculcates narrow and oppressive conventions of sexiness. To put it plainly, 
appreciating sexiness is part of recognizing a person’s full humanity. Cultivating one’s 
own sexiness, too, is a worthwhile aesthetic and ethical project—but one whose explo-
ration we must leave to another occasion.14
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